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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
UNlVERSAL UNDERWRITERS 
IN SURAN CE COMP ANY, a 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
ALLSTATE INSURANCE 
COMP ANY, a Corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No.11176 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant's Statement of Facts is correctly 
stated. 
However, Appellant omitted including the fact that 
the Allstate policy also contained the following provision: 
''If there is other insurance 
" ... The insurance with respect to a tempo-
rary substitute automobile or a non-owned auto-
mobile shall be excess insurance over any other 
collectible insurance." (Exhibit D-1) 
1 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE USE OF A CUSTOMER'S CAR BY A GARAGE Al 
PART OF ITS CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION OWING TO 
THE CUSTOMER IS EXCLUDED AS USE IN THE AUTO 
MOBILE BUSINESS. 
The true test of whether a car is being used in tht 
automobile business at the time of an accident should b1, 
we submit, the same test applied to the question of agency. 
If the driver is an agent for the automobile business, act-
ing within the scope of his agency for the benefit of tl1~ 
business, there should be no doubt that the car was beini 
used in the business. 
This Court has recognized that test: 
In National Farmers Union vs. Farmers Insurance 
Group, 14 Ut. 2d 89 377 P 2d 786 (1963), the customer, 
insured by National Farmers Union took his car to 
Bountiful Motors for repairs. Farmers Insurance Group 
insured Bountiful Motors. A salesman loaned the custo 
mer his private car to drive to the customer's home ana 
enroute the customer was involved in an accident. 
The Supreme Court held that the car, under the cir· 
cumstances, was not being used in the garage busines1, 
and the Court states, after citing other cases: 
"These cases look at the use of the car from the 
standpoint of the driver. In this case the driver··· 
was not an employee or agent of Bountiful Motor 
2 
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Company, and was not in any way engaged in the 
automobile business. The (salesman's) automo-
bile was not turned over to (the customer) to be 
used by him for any business purpose." 
The Plaintiff-Appellant has heretofore been advised 
by the Supreme Court of Virginia that its position stated 
to this Court is untenable. 
In Uuiversal Underwriters vs. Strohkorf, 205 Va. 
472, 137 SE 2d 913, the facts were that Perdue, an em-
ployee of E. R. Motor Company was driving a customer's 
car, after repairs, for the purpose of delivering it to 
another location where the customer was to pick up the 
repaired car. Enroute the employee of the Motor Com-
pany was involved in an accident. 
The policy exclusion in the customer's insurance 
policy was the same as the one here. The Virginia Su-
preme Court states : 
"The admission of Universal that its ... policy 
covered the operation of the car by Perdue is 
necessarily an admission that the operation was 
'in the automobile business' of E. R. Motors, be-
cause that is one of the hazards insured against 
under the express terms of Universal's policy. 
Obviously if the operation of the car by Perdue 
was a use in the automobile business of E. R. 
Motors within the meaning of the insuring clause 
of Universal's policy, it was a use in such auto-
mobile business within the meaning of the exclu-
sion clause of United's policy." 
3 
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"The use of the vehicle was not incidental to E. R.'s 
business." It was an integral part of the service 
offered customers for the obvious purpose of 
increasing business." (Emphasis added) 
In the instant case, Olsen Chevrolet had agreed, as 
part of their fine super service extended to customers, to 
pick up, repair, and retitrn the customer's car to his door 
step. The garage had not yet completed their "contract" 
when their agent, while attempting to carry out the 
garage's duties, was involved in the collision. 
The Nebraska Supreme Court, citing with approval 
this Court's opinion in the National Farmers case (Supra 
pg. 2) has expertly rationalized the cases. 
In Truck Insurance Exchange vs. State Farm Mu-
tual, 192 Neb. 330; 154 N.W. 2nd 524 the facts were that 
Tennison (Service Station) agreed to service Naughton's 
car which the customer was to pick up at the station later. 
While moving the car for the purpose of parking it, Ten-
nison was involved in a collision. The exclusions in the 
policies were identical with the ones here. The Court 
states-Page 525: 
". . . Tennison was engaged in the business of 
servicing automobiles. In connection with such 
business, it was necessary to occasionally move 
and park the vehicles serviced. They did not hav.e 
authority to use the Naughton vehicle for their 
own purposes in the furtherance of their busine~s 
... but only to service and care for it." (Emphasis 
ours) 
4 
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Appellant's eases are not at all as clear as its Brief 
would indicate. 
In Allstate vs. Skawinski, 40 lll. App. 2d 136, 189 
N.E. 2d 365, quoted at Page 9 of Appellant's Brief, All-
state insured the garage; the garage man was working 
on the motor, and not even in the car, when the car jump-
ed forward and injured the car owner. The Court, of 
course, held that the garage man was not "using" the car, 
but was repairing it. The Court then states - Page 367: 
"If Skawinski was employing the automobile to 
obtain parts, or for delivery purposes, or as a 
'courtesy car' for the benefit of his customers, then 
he would indeed have been using this non-owned 
automobile in his business." 
Again Capece vs. Allstate vs. State Farm, 86 N.J. 
Super 462, 207 Atl. 2d 207, cited at Page 8 of Appellant's 
Brief is hardly of help in this case. There, the service 
station operator was moving the customer's car to put it 
on a hoist to service it, and the Court held that was not 
a "use" within the exclusion. 
Cherot v. U. S. F. & G., 264 Fed. 2d 767 (Pg. 5 App. 
Brief) the Court simply held that the driver in question 
\rns not engaged in the automobile business in the first 
place. 
In Western Alliance vs. Cox, (Texas) 394 S.W. 2d 
238 (Pg. 11 App. Brief) the insured asked a friend to 
drive the insured car to a service station which was own-
ed by the permittee's father, and was involved in an 
accident enroute. Of course, under those facts, the ex-
clusion would not apply. 
; 
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Of course, we do not contend that conflict between 
some Jurisdictions does not exist, on the interpretation 
of the exclusionary clause in light with different factual 
situations. From our review of the cases it is quite ap-
parent that some Jurisdictions have refused to deprive 
the insitred protection \\'here he is equally liable with 
t11e driver. (e.g. Where the owner is liable for the negli-
gence of the driver). 
We feel this Court has followed the better reasoned 
cases, and that the right of the Insurance Companies 
to limit their coverage so as not to include garages or 
agents of automobile businesses should be upheld. 
7 Appleman Insurance Law and Practice, Sec. 4372, 
Pg. 341, states: 
"Under a standard automobile policy, a limitation 
is applied to the coverage of the ... policy so as 
not to extend coverage over to a ... garage ... 
even though such establishment has rightful cus-
tody of the vehicle ... Such clauses are held 
reasonable and valid, and have repeatedly been 
enforced by the Courts, which have considered that 
the hazard in such a business is undoubtedly great-
er and have permitted the insurer to limit the 
risk which it desires to assume." 
POINT TWO 
A GARAGE CUSTOMER HAS NO LEGAL OR OTHER 
REASON TO PROVIDE LIABILITY PROTECTION FOR THE 
GARAGE, OR 'l'O REDUCE THE RISKS ASSUMED BY THE 
GARAGE'S INSURER. 
6 
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The exclusion under consideration is included in all 
personal liability insurance policies for a reason, to re-
duce the risks, and therefore the premiums charged. If 
Appellant's contentions were correct, and by Judicial De-
cree of this Court, the exclusion is eliminated from the 
policy, we need not be a seer to foresee a rise in insurance 
premiums on all private passenger car policies. This is 
obvious from the very fact that overnight the companies 
will have several new "additional insureds" on every 
policy written in the State of Utah. Every vehicle needs 
servicing and repairs, and under Appellant's theory, 
every service station and every garage, every used car 
dealer and every parking lot that gains temporary cus-
tody of a car is from now on a mere permissive user of 
the owner for whom the owner must pay an additional 
premium to protect them from legal liability. 
The Washington Supreme Court in Northwestern 
1llutual lnsiirance Co. vs. Great American Insurance Co., 
404 Pac. 2d 995, (App. Brief, Pg. 11) states: 
"And so, here, the owner of the car, which had 
been serviced and was being returned to his home, 
would be quite astonished to learn that his car -
all of the time that it was out of his possession-
was being used in the automobile business." 
If we may paraphrase that Honorable Court, we 
might state: 
Olsen Chevrolet Company, who had paid a prem-
ium to protect itself from liability arising from the 
negligence of its employees, would be quite aston-
ished to learn that the customers have unwittingly 
been providing that coverage. 
7 
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The Appellant is an insurance company who was paid 
a premium for its Garage Liability Policy. There is no 
rhyme nor reason why it should be released from the 
risk it was paid to accept. By this Appeal, the Appellant 
is attempting to advance its own interest only. It cannot 
even maintain that it is upholding the interest of its own 
insured, Olsen Chevrolet Company. 
The contention of Universal, therefore, that the 
policy should be strictly construed against Allstate is 
without any basis in logic or reason. 
In LeFelt vs. Nasarow, 7l N.J. Super 538 (App. Brief 
Pg.11): 
"Solution of a problem of construction of an insur-
ance policy must be approached with a well settled 
doctrine in mind. If the controlling language will 
support two meanings, one favorable to the in-
surer, and the other favorable to the insured, the 
interpretation sustaining coverage must be ap-
plied. Courts are bound to protect the insured to 
the full extent that any fair interpretation will 
allow. 
"These general rules of construction have spawned 
a number of subsidiary ones of equally universal 1 
recognition. For example, where the policy provi-
sion under examination relates to the inclusion of 
persons other than the named insured within the 
protection afforded, a broad and liberal view is 
taken of the coverage extended. Bid, if the claitse 
in question is one of exclusion or exception, de-
signed to limit the protection, a strict interpreta-
tion is applied. Cal-Farm Ins. Co. v. Boisseranc, 
151 Cal. App. 2d 775, 312 P.2d 401, 405 (D.C. App. 
1957)." 
8 
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Certainly Universal cannot maintain that the policy 
should be construed in "favor" of Allstate's insured when 
such a "favorable" interpretation would raise the in-
sured's premium. 
POINT THREE 
IN ANY EVENT, UNIVERSAL'S INSURANCE COV-
ERAGE IS PRIMARY. 
We believe that it is probably a moot question in-
asmuch as we feel strongly that the exclusionary clause 
is enforceable and should be upheld. 
However, even if this Court should rule otherwise, 
both insurance policies provide that if there is other 
valid and collectible insurance, the policy is secondary 
coverage to the other policy. 
Universal's insured, Olsen Chevrolet Company, 
through its agent, who was operating the vehicle in the 
course and scope of his employment, was involved in 
the accident. There could be absolutely no liability upon 
Allstate's insured. 
Even the Washington Court in the N orwestern Mu-
tual case (supra) refused to rule that the customer's 
insurance was primary. 
9 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that the 
Judgment of the District Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L.E. MIDGLEY 
702 El Paso Natural Gas Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Respondent 
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